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reduces the efficiency increase from the ‘learning’ effect, possibly to the extent that 
overall efficiency deteriorates. We use simulations to analyze the resulting impact in a 
dynamic setting. For realistic parameter values we find that option trading leads to 
lower price errors in the underlying. The more popular options are, the more quickly 
information is incorporated in the underlying prices. However, uninformed traders do 
not necessarily benefit from this speedier convergence. Their stock performance 
crucially depends on the insider's trading strategy and the fraction of informed trading. 
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1. Introduction 
 
There exists a large body of empirical work on the impact of option trading on the 
time-series properties of the underlying. Of the comparatively small number of 
theoretical papers, at least two use a sequential trade model in the spirit of Glosten and 
Milgrom (1985): Easley, O’Hara and Srinivas (1998; further referred to as Easley et 
al), and a working paper by John, Koticha, Narayanan and Subrahmanyam (2000; 
further referred to as John et al). Both models are developed in an asymmetric 
information setting in which informed traders may trade in stock or option markets. 
Easley et al (1998) study whether option markets attract informed trading and whether 
they incorporate information more quickly than stock markets. They derive that under 
certain conditions options are attractive to traders with superior information and find 
empirical support for the phenomenon that properly defined bullish and bearish option 
volume has predictive power for the price process of the underlying. John et al (2000) 
focus on the impact of option trading on the efficiency of the underlying price process, 
and the role of margin requirements. Depending on the criterion used, they find that 
options increase or decrease efficiency.  
 
We start from the viewpoint that as long as some informed traders use options, option 
trades convey information about the underlying. Similar to John et al (2000) this 
paper’s central theme is the impact of option trading on various efficiency criteria of 
the underlying security. Contrary to their analysis however, we derive the criteria in a 
dynamic setting and analyze them for different reasonable insider strategies.  
 
First, we elaborate on a model similar to theirs, and show that the model is inherently 
dynamic. Expectations are updated after every trade, which allows us to study a 
sequence of trades and analyze new and more precise criteria. We will show that the 
focus on only first trades, leads to the use of inaccurate efficiency criteria. Our 
analysis indicates that an option may serve as an extra source from which information 
can be inferred, which speeds up convergence. However, we also find that uninformed 
traders do not necessarily benefit from this speedier convergence, especially when 
there are few informed traders. 
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In the initial design the dealer maximizes profits on every individual trade. This is 
realistic if there is strong competition among informed traders, but we believe this 
might not always be the case in practice. We show that other strategies are preferable 
when the insider is concerned about the effect of his trades on future profit 
opportunities, or when he has limited investment resources. In general, in other 
strategies the insider directs more trading from the stock to the option market, which 
might make it harder to identify him among the other traders. When the insider 
(temporarily) has a monopolistic position, he will choose a strategy that resembles the 
uninformed traders' randomization across stock and option markets in order to hide his 
information. This dynamic strategy leads to a slower convergence, but also smaller 
spreads in the stock market. When the insider has limited resources to invest, or when 
the insider can trade at a larger size in the option, more informed trades will be 
directed to the option market, and underlying spreads decrease even more. 
 
 
2. The model 
 
We develop a sequential trade model that is similar in nature to that of Easley et al 
(1998) and John et al (2000). These two papers add one or two plain-vanilla options to 
the model of Glosten and Milgrom (1985). In our model, trading takes place in two 
assets, a stock and a call option on that stock. Results are qualitatively the same if a 
put instead of a call option, or both, would be included. We include only one option 
type to facilitate the derivations and the insights in the most import mechanisms.  
 
The model is a standard adverse selection model in market microstructure. It explains 
how market mechanisms lead prices to efficient values when some traders have 
information superior to others. For a discussion of the different assumptions and the 
resemblance with real world markets, we especially refer to the papers by Glosten and 
Milgrom (1985) and Easley and O'Hara (1987). The market is quote driven, which 
means that buyers and sellers trade with a market maker (also referred to as dealer or 
specialist), who is responsible for providing bid and ask quotes. We assume market 
makers are profit maximizing and risk-neutral. Trading takes place for one unit of one 
asset at a time. Liquidity and inside traders initiate trades. The liquidity traders trade 
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for reasons of liquidity, such as portfolio rebalancing and time-varying consumption 
and income. We do not further specify their reasons for trading, but assume their 
demand and supply is completely inelastic, so independent of the outstanding quotes. 
This excludes the possibility of a market breakdown. The informed traders get private 
and perfect signals regarding the true asset value. They are completely free to engage 
in trades and will do so in the pursuit of profits.  
 
The random variable S represents the intrinsic value of the stock, and the random 
variable C the intrinsic value of the option. The true asset value may be regarded as a 
value that every market participant agrees upon after all information has become 
public. The stock value can either take on a low value X-v or a high value X+v. These 
stock values occur with respective probabilities of dL and dH, whose sum equals unity. 
The option has an exercise price of X and its value can directly be derived from the 
value of the stock: C = Max[0, S-X].  
 
All possible outcomes of a single transaction and their relative probabilities are 
depicted in figure 1. At the beginning of a period, the informed trader receives a signal 
indicating whether the stock value is high or low. Next, trading for that period begins. 
Dealers set quotes to buy or sell during the trading period, execute orders as they 
arrive, and then revise their quotes. Informed traders always buy when the stock value 
is high, sell when it is low. Liquidity traders on the other hand have an equal 
probability to buy or sell1. Informed and uninformed traders anonymously post trades 
at random intervals in both markets, making it for the dealers a priori impossible to 
determine whether they trade with an informed or uninformed trader. The probability 
that they trade with an informed trader is µ, with an uninformed trader 1-µ. Liquidity 
traders (LT) also randomize their trades across stock and option markets, with a 
propensity for the stock of b  and for the option of 1-b . To summarize their strategy: 
 
 Pr[LT buys S] = Pr[LT sells S] = ½(1-µ)b  
  
Pr[LT buys C] = Pr[LT sells C] = ½(1-µ)(1-b) 
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It can be shown that the insider is better off not entering in unprofitable trades (see for 
example John et al (2000)). Although unprofitable trades may confuse dealers, the 
losses incurred can not be recouped sufficiently to justify such a strategy. If there is at 
least some probability of uninformed trader activity, the dealers' bids and asks in the 
stock are strictly in between their minimum and maximum theoretical values. 
Therefore, when the stock value is high, the insider can profitably buy both assets; 
when it is low, the insider can profitably sell both assets.  
 
The insider always has two profitable trading opportunities, one in the stock and one 
in the option. From the outset it is unclear what trading strategy would be optimal. We 
explore three different strategies. In the first the insider maximizes profits at every 
individual trade, and is not concerned about the effect of trading on prices. This 
strategy could be justified by the presence of many other informed traders, who will 
cause available profits to vanish quickly. We denote the probability that an informed 
trader transacts in the stock by p (pL for a low stock value, pH for a high stock value). 
If one market offers a larger profit than the other, the insider employs a pure strategy, 
and only trades the more profitable asset. If both markets offer the same profit, the 
insider randomizes between stock and option with relative preferences such that 
profits in both markets are indeed equal, and the market is in equilibrium. This is the 
strategy explored in Easley et al (1998) and John et al (2000). As we will see later in 
the text, it leads to a relative preference for the stock market.  
 
In the second strategy, the insider is concerned about the effect of trading on prices. 
One explanation is that the insider expects to destroy future trading profits if he trades 
too openly on his information. Alternatively, due to regulatory restrictions the insider 
might not be allowed to trade on inside information and tries to hide his trades. In 
order to disguise his superior information, the insider does not want to distinguish 
himself too much from the other traders, and will direct more trades to the option 
market than in the first strategy.  
 
The third strategy also leads to an increased preference for the option, but motivated 
by the insider having limited investment resources. In that case, he will not primarily 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1 Changing the latter assumption makes the derivation of results more cumbersome, but leaves the 
results qualitatively unchanged. 
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be concerned about absolute profits, but also in returns. Allowing trade size in the 
option to be larger than in the stock, as in Easley et al (1998) has the same effect. 
Although margin requirements in the option increase the required investment in the 
option, total investment for one unit of the option will always be lower than for one 
unit in the stock. This leverage effect improves the attractiveness of the option market. 
 
A small remark applies to a difference in design with several other sequential trade 
models. In our model there is always someone in the market with inside information, 
although a random information event would be closer to real world markets, where no 
one might have an informational advantage. If inside information is known to exist, it 
is even common practice in real world markets to halt trading until it is publicly 
announced. However, the random occurrence of information in our setup has the same 
effect as a decrease in the possibility of an insider trade. To simplify the analysis, we 
therefore assume an information event always occurs. 
 
 
3. Efficiency criteria 
 
John et al (2000) study two different criteria to measure differences in efficiency, of 
which the first is the initial spread in the stock. If we define the bid in the stock at the 
time of the t’th transaction (either stock or option) as Bs,t, the corresponding ask as 
As,t, then the initial spread Ds,1 equals: 
 
 Ds,1  := As,1 – Bs,1    Initial stock spread   (1) 
 
The authors call their second criterion "the amount of information revealed through 
trading". It is defined as the ratio of two stock variances: the numerator contains the 
variance of expectations after the first trade, the denominator the variance of intrinsic 
values: 
 
 h  := Var(E1[S]) / Var(S) Variance ratio     (2) 
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The idea of the variance ratio is that the higher it is, the more information the first 
trade reveals, the more efficient the market. John et al (2000) find that the inclusion of 
an option market increases the initial spread (decreases efficiency), and increases the 
variance ratio (increases efficiency). In the discussion of results they place more 
emphasis on the variance ratio and conclude that an option market improves overall 
efficiency. 
 
The problem with using these two criteria for efficiency evaluation (and partly the 
reason for their conflicting outcomes) is that they completely rely on the first trade. 
This is problematic, since the introduction of an option market opens up the possibility 
that the first trade is not in the stock, but in the option instead. For the variance ratio, 
John et al (2000) ‘solve’ this problem by including the expected in stead of realized 
stock values in case there is an option trade. To our opinion, only transaction prices 
should be included, because expectations cannot be observed, are not realized and thus 
not relevant. Moreover, the static criteria ignore the most important dynamic 
mechanism, i.e. increased learning, that an option introduction is accompanied with. 
That’s why we explore more direct methods to measure efficiency, which are solely 
based on realized trades in the stock.  
 
We agree that an option market may improve efficiency (measured differently), but for 
a different reason. If an option trade precedes a stock trade, expectations are updated, 
and bids and asks in the stock are adjusted to the new information. This ‘cross-
learning’ behavior is the main reason that we expect an option market to speed up 
convergence in the underlying. Ignoring this dynamic effect yields an underestimation 
of the option's beneficial influence. It should be noted that John et al (2000) were 
inspired by Kyle (1985) in the choice of their efficiency criteria. In that model 
however, the above problems do not arise, because every trade, and thus every first 
trade, takes place in the stock.  
 
Let us now specify our first two dynamic efficiency criteria:  
 
Ds  := As - Bs Realized stock spread     (3) 
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PEs  := | Ps - S | Realized stock price error     (4) 
 
where Ps is the realized stock price. 
 
We call these criteria dynamic, because they require the generation of a sequence of 
trades. The disadvantage of these dynamics is that the solutions can no longer be 
derived analytically, but need to be based on numerical simulations. That’s why the 
statistics we report later in the text are the averages of the above statistics for a large 
number of simulations.  
 
A logical way to calculate the above statistics would be at the first stock trade, which 
may occur after a sequence of option trades. An alternative is to analyze the above 
statistics only at the first liquidity trade in the stock. This can be justified by the notion 
that new entrants to a market will normally have no specific knowledge about 
fundamental values. For example, they won’t directly bother about the average price 
errors faced by an insider, at least not beyond the effect it has on their own trades and 
their own profitability. In order to define the attractiveness of a market, the focus 
should be on uninformed trades. Furthermore, a market may be classified as efficient 
if differences in inside information do not have too much of an impact on trading 
performance. Since the average losses of uninformed traders equal half the realized 
spread, we are able to calculate uninformed traders’ losses by calculating their realized 
spreads. Because the definition of efficiency can still be a matter of taste, where it is 
informative we report efficiency both from the viewpoint of an outsider and of all 
traders (including informed).  
 
Another statistic of interest is the volatility of prices or returns. A large body of 
empirical work is devoted to the influence of option trading on volatility in the 
underlying. Numerous studies find that option listing causes a decrease in volatility, 
although in several other studies the results are mixed or insignificant.2 However, as 
Skinner points out, the results should be interpreted with care, because ….  
                                                                 
2 The following find a decrease in volatility: CBOE (1975 and 1976), Trennepohl and Dukes 
(1979), Skinner (1989), Conrad (1989), Detemple and Jorion (1990), Damodaran and Lim (1991), 
Kumar, Sarin and Shastri (1998). In the following the results are mixed or insignificant: Klemkosky and 
Maness (1980), Whiteside, Dukes and Dunne (1983), Fedenia and Grammatikos (1992), Fleming and 
Ostdiek (1999). 
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For a given intrinsic value we calculate volatility as the standard deviation of (first) 
realized stock prices over a large number of simulations. The larger the number of 
noise traders, the more transactions are in both directions (buy and sell). Although 
uninformed traders generally favor little variation in prices, we are inclined not to 
define volatility as an exact criterion of efficiency. For convenience however, we 
report it with the other efficiency criteria.  
 
Vols := s( Ps) Standard deviation (s(.)) of realised stock price  (5) 
 
 
 
4. Results 
 
Before we can present the results, we first have to derive the equilibrium dealer quotes 
for a given insider strategy. Dealers set bids and ask such that they make zero profits 
on average. 
 
4.1 Equilibrium quotes 
 
The dealers are uninformed and thus lose on every transaction with a better- informed 
trader. Uninformed liquidity traders are necessary in this design for the dealers to 
break even on average. Dealers' quoted bid-ask spread gives them a relative advantage 
over the liquidity traders, who lose on average. 
 
The zero-profit assumption of dealers can be motivated by the presence of competing 
dealers or zero entrance costs for new competitive dealers. Therefore, the dealer sets a 
bid price that equals the stock value conditional on receiving a sales order (Q = -S). If 
he trades with the insider (probability µ), he knows that the insider sells when the 
stock value is low (X-v, probability dL) and when the insider chooses to trade the stock 
instead of the option (probability pL). If the dealer trades with a liquidity trader 
(probability 1-µ), he knows this trader sells the stock with probability ½ß, independent 
of the true stock value. Using Bayesian inference we obtain: 
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Similarly, the dealer sets an ask price that equals the stock value conditional on 
receiving a purchase order (Q = +S): 
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The bid and the ask for the option can be derived likewise, keeping in mind that the 
option value is zero if the stock value is low or in the middle: 
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4.2 Insiders maximize profits at every trade  
 
In the first part of our analysis we follow Easley et al (1998) and John et al (2000), 
who assume that informed traders maximize profits at every individual trade, and are 
thus not concerned about their effect on prices. Later we will see that this may not be 
the optimal strategy if an insider is able to execute more than one trade. The insider's 
single-trade-strategy is of the following form. 
 
Insider strategy A: 
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   If he receives signal L, then:  
 pL = 0   if BS - X + v < BC always sell the option  
 pL = 1   if BS - X + v > BC always sell the stock 
 0 < pL < 1  if BS - X + v = BC randomize between stock and option 
 
   If he receives signal H, then:  
 pH = 0   if AS - X  > AC always buy the option 
 pH = 1   if AS - X < AC  always buy the stock  
 0 < pH < 1  if AS - X  = AC randomize between stock and option 
 
We now have to determine under what conditions each of the above situations hold. 
 
Suppose the insider receives the signal L and suppose furthe r that the profit of selling 
the stock equals that of selling the option. Equating both profits and using the 
expressions for the bid in stock (6) and call (8), we can derive that he transacts the 
stock with probability pL and the option with probability 1- pL, both between zero and 
one: 
 
( ) ( )
b
bmdm
dm
b
p
+
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If the insider receives the signal H, and the available profits in both markets are equal, 
the probability of buying the stock is: 
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p
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2
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H
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It can be shown that the above p's exceed ß, so the insider has a larger preference for 
the stock than the liquidity traders have. Please note that if the insider increases his 
relative preference for the stock (pH or pL), the stock quotes narrow and the option 
quotes widen. This makes it easy to see that if one of the above formulae exceeds one, 
and so the actual p equals one, the profit of trading the stock is higher than of trading 
the option. It is also easy to see that the above expressions never equal zero (except for 
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some boundary values) and so the insider will never only trade the option. This is 
intuitive, because the stock has a larger variability (is more 'information sensitive') and 
hence cannot offer lower absolute profits than the option.   
 
To facilitate the derivation of efficiency criteria we make the plausible assumption that 
from the outset the probability of an upward and downward move are equal, i.e. we 
assume that dL=dH=½.  
 
Static criteria 
 
The initial stock spread can be derived analytically, using the expressions for bid and 
ask (6 and 8), and the insider’s equilibrium strategy (10 and 11) : 
 
If pL<1 and pH<1, then: 
 
( ) ( )( ) vs ×-×-+=D bmm 1121,       (12) 
 
The initial spread increases linearly in the probability of an informed trade (µ), and in 
the distance between the low and high signal (v), and decreases in the relative 
preference of the liquidity traders for the stock market (ß). If the insider's preference 
for trading the stock (p) hits its upper bound of one, the initial spread will be lower 
than the above expression, because the insider cannot trade the stock as much as he 
would have wanted. Most interesting is that the initial spread decreases in ß, so 
uninformed traders initially face a higher spread in the stock market the more they 
trade the option. We obtain a market with only stock trading by setting ß equal to its 
maximum value of one. Then the liquidity traders only trade the stock, and so does the 
insider. Using this static criterion we therefore find that the introduction of an option 
decreases the efficiency in the underlying. 
 
The second static criterion is the variance ratio. The denominator of the variance ratio, 
the unconditional stock variance, equals v2. The numerator, the variance in expected 
stock values after one trade, is more complicated. Following a transaction in the stock, 
the dealers have updated expectations of the stock value equal to the bid (6) or ask (7). 
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Following a trade in the option, the expected stock values are similar to expression (6) 
and (7), but with p replaced by 1-p, and ß replaced by 1- ß. If we weight these updated 
expectations with the probability of the respective trades, we can derive the analytical 
expression for the variance ratio (in a mixed strategy) 
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The above expression is minimal for ß equal to zero and one, and has a unique 
maximum in between (recall that p=pL=pH is a function of ß and m). This implies that 
a market with only stock trading (ß=1) would be less efficient than a market with 
trading in both assets. However, it is not true that more option trading always makes 
the market more efficient. At some level of uninformed option trading, more option 
trading decreases the market’s efficiency, at least according to this criterion.  
 
Dynamic criteria 
 
We have already explained why static criteria are inappropriate for evaluating the 
beneficial influence of an option. They are malspecified and ignore the fact that the 
stock dealers 'learn' from the trades in the option.  
 
First, observe that the above results depend crucially on the assumption that the insider 
maximizes his profit at every single trade. For example, if he tries to mimic the 
uninformed traders by attaching the same preference to the stock market as the 
uninformed do (pL=pH=ß), then the initial spread and variance ratio are unaffected by 
the introduction of an option. We will show that this strategy is indeed more profitable 
in the long run, but first calculate the updated beliefs of the dealers after they observe 
a transaction.  
 
If the dealers observe for example a stock purchase, they know an uninformed trader 
initiated it with probability 1-µ, and that it then does not contain any information about 
intrinsic values. However, they know that it could also have been an informed trade, 
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and that the stock value must then be high. They update their beliefs according to the 
following scheme: 
 
a. After a stock purchase: 
( )
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b. After a stock sale:  
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c. After an option purchase: 
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d. After an option sale: 
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After a purchase in stock or option, the probability of a high stock value is revised 
upwards, and revised downwards after a sale. The larger the insider's preference for 
the stock (pH), and the larger the proportion of informed traders (µ), the more a stock 
purchase signals a high stock value.  
 
The updated beliefs form the basis to generate a sequence of trades. At every point in 
time, we randomly select a trade and trader type according to the different 
probabilities. Then we update beliefs and randomly select a new trade and trader type. 
We continue till we obtain a (liquidity) trade in the stock, either a purchase or a sale. 
Since there is an infinite number of possible sequences, and because the beliefs are 
updated differently in every sequence, we believe it is impossible to derive our 
dynamic efficiency statistics theoretically3. Therefore, we rely on a large number (one 
million) of simulations 4 to clarify the dynamics.  
 
The parameters X and v are only necessary to scale the stock and option, but do not 
affect the insider's strategy or the updating of beliefs. Without loss of generality, we 
can therefore fix them, for example to 100 and 10 respectively. It is also reasonable 
                                                                 
3 If it is possible, we would appreciate to hear so. 
4 The simulation program (Visual Basic for Applications in an Excel file) is available on request. 
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that a priori there is no higher probability of an upward move than a downward move, 
so we keep dH=dL=½. The parameters ß and µ are more delicate, so we will carefully 
study various values. But first we assume there is an equal proportion of informed and 
uninformed traders (µ=½), and the uninformed trade as often in the stock as in the 
option (ß=½).  
 
 
 
INSERT TABLE I APPROXIMATELY HERE 
 
 
 
In this base case, the initial available profits in stock and option are equal (table I). 
That's why the insider starts with a mixed strategy, although he prefers the stock five 
times to the option. Initially, he faces a spread in the stock market of 12.50, in the 
option of 2.50. If a liquidity trader trades before him, and trades in the opposite 
direction of the correct value, he trades the stock even more intensively. However, if 
he or another trader trades in the direction of the correct value, he subsequently shifts 
more trading to the option. This happens, because his preference for the stock (p) 
decreases in the correct expectation. Spreads narrow after the first trade, irrespective 
of the trade type, because a trade directs the expectations into one direction (the stock 
distribution becomes skewed). Table I also shows that a stock trade is followed by a 
stronger update of beliefs than an option trade. This is due to the relatively higher 
preference for the stock of the insider than of the liquidity traders (p>ß).  
 
Table II reports the static and dynamic efficiency statistics corresponding to this base 
case and various fractions of uninformed trading in the stock (ß). We first focus on the 
data corresponding to an equal proportion of informed and uninformed traders (µ=½). 
The statistics of panel A are based on the first trade in the stock, and those of panel C 
on the first liquidity trade in the stock. All reported values are independent of whether 
the true stock value is low (90) or high (110). 
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INSERT TABLE II APPROXIMATELY HERE 
 
 
 
We can infer the following results from table II for increasing levels of uninformed 
trading in the option (decreasing ß).  
 
Thanks to the coverage of the option market, the insider is able to execute more option 
trades before the first stock trade. This increase in trading activity makes it easier for 
dealers to form their opinion on the correct stock value, which in turn leads to lower 
realized price errors in the stock for all trader types.  
 
The effect on stock price volatility is ambiguous: volatility is highest for intermediate 
levels of option trading. This can be explained by the phenomenon that realized stock 
prices depend on the number and direction of previous option trades, which vary most 
for intermediate levels of option trading.  
 
The effect of increased option trading on stock spreads is ambiguous as well. From 
equation (12) we know that the initial quoted spread increases in the fraction of option 
trading, but this result does hold for realized spreads. Those may increase or decrease. 
Both insiders and liquidity traders may be faced by an increased spread, though the 
possible spread increase faced by uninformed traders is smaller than by informed 
traders. Liquidity traders face only somewhat larger stock spreads when they execute 
few trades in the option (ß=0.9) compared to when they only trade the stock (ß=1.0). 
Although the difference is very limited, it will harm their performance in the stock 
market.  
 
To clarify the ambiguous results on realized spread and volatility, we restrict the 
fraction of informed traders to a more realistic 25% (table II). It is then easier to see 
that uninformed traders do not necessarily benefit in the stock market from their 
activity in the option market. In fact, if uninformed traders form a large proportion of 
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the total population, realized stock spreads (and so stock losses) and volatility increase 
the more they trade the option. This phenomenon is due to the insider's strategy, which 
is aimed at maximizing profits at every individual trade. This strategy leads to a larger 
preference for the stock than the liquidity traders' preference for the stock. This in turn 
causes informed traders to reap a relatively large part of all stock trades. 
Mathematically (see equation 10 and 11), p/(p+ß) increases in the fraction of 
uninformed traders (1-µ) and the amount of uninformed option trading (1-ß).  
 
If the insider maximizes profits at every individual trade, the following summarizes 
the effect of option trading on the price process of the underlying. First, option trading 
decreases price errors. Second, option trading has ambiguous consequences for 
volatility, realized spreads and losses of uninformed traders. In a market where 
informed traders form a large part of the population, volatility, spreads and losses may 
increase or decrease, depending on the exact intensity of uninformed option trading. In 
a market with few informed traders (which is likely to be true in real world markets), 
an option market increases volatility, spreads and liquidity traders' losses.  
 
4.3 Other insider strategies 
 
The above results depend crucially on the assumption that an insider maximizes 
profits at every individual trade. This strategy causes the insider to have a relative 
preference for the stock, and this preference increases for high levels of uninformed 
trading and for high levels of uninformed trading in the option. Yet this strategy may 
not be optimal for a number of reasons.  
 
Mimicking the uninformed traders 
 
A first reason to deviate from strategy A is that insiders are concerned about the effect 
of their trading on prices. This concern might be fuelled by regulatory restrictions to 
exploit inside information or by the fear to destroy future trading profits. Regulatory 
restrictions are hard to model and more likely to curb the number of trades than that 
they affect the insider’s preference for stock or call. The second concern however is 
more realistic and insightful to analyze, because it shows us whether the fear to 
destroy future trading profits justifies a deviation from the original trading strategy. 
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We will analyze a strategy B, in which the insider directs the same proportion of 
trades to the stock as the uninformed traders do in order to hide his superior 
information. Later we show that this indeed increases profits if the insider is able to 
execute several trades. 
 
Insider strategy B: 
 
    bpp == HL          (18) 
 
 
Strategy B is independent of the quoted bids and asks, the fraction of informed traders 
and the fraction of uninformed trades directed to the option. Let us start with the initial 
quoted spread and the variance ratio. Because the insider follows the same strategy as 
the uninformed traders, the probability that a trade in the stock is informed is 
independent of the uninformed intens ity of option trading. Therefore, initial spread 
and variance ratio are independent of b  and smaller than when the insider employs 
strategy A. 
  
 vs ×=D m1,          (19) 
 
 2mh =          (20) 
 
 
 
INSERT TABLE III APPROXIMATELY HERE 
 
 
 
In table III we present the dynamic efficiency statistics based on the first stock trade 
and first uninformed stock trade when the insider mimics the liquidity traders. 
Although the prices converge more slowly than with the previously analysed strategy, 
the stock market becomes more efficient the more options are traded, both from the 
 19 
 
 
viewpoint of all traders as from the viewpoint of uninformed traders. Since the insider 
and liquidity traders direct an equal proportion of trades to the stock market, this 
efficiency gain is solely due to the increased learning ability of the dealers. Strategy B 
thus separates the learning effect from the insider strategy effect. 
 
Compared to strategy A, the average spreads, losses and volatility in the stock are 
lower, because the stock dealers do not fear the insiders so much. On the other hand, 
with this mimicking strategy prices converge more slowly, as is the aim of the insider. 
Dealers have now more difficulty to detect where the insider is trading. Their prices 
are less accurate and realized price errors larger (but lower than without options)5.  
 
Since the dealers break even on average, the lower liquidity trader losses in the stock 
imply lower insider profits in the stock. Yet overall the insider is better off, because 
the reduced profits in the stock are more than offset by larger profits in the option 
(table IV). This effect is independent of the intensity of insider trading (m) or the 
intensity of uninformed trading in the stock (b). Therefore, the insider’s new 
mimicking strategy outperforms the original strategy in terms of overall profits. 
Depending on the number of trades the insider is able to execute, he optimally chooses 
a strategy in between strategy A and B. The less the competition he faces with other 
informed traders, the more he will try to mimic the liquidity traders. He will shift 
trading to the option market even more if he has limited resources to invest, as will be 
shown next.  
 
Maximizing returns 
 
A reason for insiders to forego immediate expected profits is that they have limited 
resources to invest, or that they are not so certain about their signal. In either case, 
they will be not so much concerned about maximizing profits, but rather about 
maximizing returns. Even though margin requirements increase option investments, 
the required investment in the option to achieve a certain leverage is lower than in the 
stock. John et al (2000) derive the insider’s optimal trading strategy when the insider 
                                                                 
5 One small exception can be detected in tables II and III with respect to the smaller price errors. 
Additional analysis made clear that price errors are only smaller in strategy B compared to strategy A 
for a combination of unrealistically high proportions of insider trading and uninformed option trading. 
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maximizes returns and margin requirements are in place. They model margin 
requirements into detail. To arrive at a more tractable solution, we derive the insider’s 
strategy without exactly specifying those requirements, which also has the advantage 
that there are no differences in margin requirements for going long and short. With 
only a traded call option namely, going short is harder than going long. This contrasts 
with real world markets, in which both call and put options are normally traded, and 
short and long positions require similar investments. We simply suppose the required 
dollar profit in the stock is ? times the dollar profit in the option. Then the insider’s 
strategy is the same as when he maximizes dollar profits per trade, but with the 
following probabilities of trading the stock. 
 
Insider strategy B: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) bgg
bmgdm
dm
b
p
×-+
-×-×-+×
×
×
=
2
1124
2
L
L
L  
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×
×
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We obtain the initial strategy A by equalizing the required dollar profit on stock and 
option (?=1). With the mimicking strategy B the available profit in the stock is always 
twice the profit in the option, so we obtain strategy B by setting ? equal to two. Again, 
if one of the above expressions exceeds one, the insider only trades the stock. It is now 
also possible for the above expressions to fall below zero (?>2). Then the insider only 
trades the option. Not surprisingly, the insider trades the stock less intensively when 
the required profit on the stock is larger than that on the option (?>1).  
 
With this strategy C, and under the assumption that the insider randomizes between 
stock and option (0<p<1), the traders face an initial spread and variance ratio of: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) vs ×-×-×-+=D bmgm 11221,  
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The lower the required investments in the option relative to the stock, the heavier the 
insider trades the option and the smaller is the difference between bid and ask. The 
variance ratio is not strictly increasing or decreasing in ?, but attains a minimal value 
of µ2 at ? = 2, when the insider has the same preference for stock and option as the 
liquidity traders. 
 
In real world markets it can be expected that a stock position requires more than twice 
the investment of an equally levered position in the option. In table IV we analyze a 
market for which the difference is a factor four. Results are similar for other values of 
?, as long as it exceeds two.  
 
 
 
INSERT TABLE IV APPROXIMATELY HERE 
 
 
 
The results indicate that option trading leads to smaller price errors and smaller 
realized spreads. Price errors are largest when the insider imitates the uninformed, so 
they are lower right now. Unfortunately, it is hard to predict the impact of option 
trading on volatility. The effect depends on the exact amount of option trading and the 
fraction of informed trading.  
 
Information rewards 
 
We haven’t analysed yet whether the insider is indeed better off by foregoing 
immediate profits. Therefore, we calculate for the three different strategies the 
insider’s earnings. Dealers earn nothing on average, so the insider profits simply equal 
the uninformed traders’ losses. We calculate profits up to moment that vertually all 
information is in the market, and the insider has exploited nearly all his superior 
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information. We establish this point when the expectation of the correct intrinsic stock 
value exceeds 99%. Apart from profits, we also present the required investments and 
returns for the different strategies (table V). Results are qualitatively unaltered when 
we change the fraction of insiders or the fraction of uninformed stock trades. 
 
 
 
INSERT TABLE V APPROXIMATELY HERE 
 
 
 
We use the fact that in real world markets, not only call options are traded, but put 
options as well. The required investments to go short are then comparable to those of 
going long. That’s why we calculate the investments for a high stock value and 
assume that with a put option market the investments are similar for a low stock value. 
Consequently, the insider’s investment in the stock is the current stock ask price, the 
investment in the option the current option ask price.  
 
When the insider maximizes profits at every individual trade (strategy A), he hardly 
trades the option. Similarly, when the option yields leverage that is four times larger 
than the stock (strategy C), he hardly trades the stock. As a result, investments are 
considerably lower and realized returns higher than with strategy A. 
 
The results clearly show that when the insider is in a monopolistic position and can 
fully exploit his superior information, he should revert to strategy B, and imitate the 
liquidity traders’ randomization across stock and option. Compared to chasing 
immediate profits his stock trades are less profitable, but more than compensated by 
option trades.  
 
Although strategy B yields the highest dollar profits, it does not yield the highest 
returns. An investment in the option is in the range of 0 to 10 dollars, whereas a stock 
investment is considerably larger, in the range of 90 to 110 dollars. Therefore, to 
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maximize returns the insider should direct more, and often all, trades to the option 
market, as in strategy C. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper clarifies two mechanisms following the introduction of an option market 
that may lead to increased efficiency in the underlying. First, market makers learn 
from trades in the option market, set more accurate prices and thus increase efficiency. 
Second, the proportion of informed traders in the stock market may be altered. If 
informed traders have a relative preference for the option, for example because an 
option enables a leveraged position, the adverse selection component of the spread and 
price errors will decrease. If however insiders trade a larger fraction than uninformed 
traders in the stock, for example because the immediate profits in the stock are larger, 
spreads in the stock widen, and price errors increase. This reduces the efficiency 
increase from the ‘learning’ effect, possibly to the extent that overall efficiency 
deteriorates.  
 
The current sequential trade literature with a derivative asset has been concentrated on 
initial quotes. Under the assumption that informed traders have a relative preference 
for the stock, spreads were found to increase, although trades reveal more information. 
Focus on just initial quoted spreads precludes the learning mechanism to take effect, 
since learning can only be observed in a sequence of trades. In a dynamic setting 
expectations concerning the true asset value are updated after every trade and a 
number of dynamic statistics can be calculated by simulation.   
 
For realistic parameter values we find that that option trading leads to lower price 
errors in the underlying. The more popular options are, the more quickly the 
underlying prices converge to the true value. However, uninformed traders do not 
necessarily benefit from this speedier convergence. Their performance crucially 
depends on the insider's trading strategy and the fraction of informed trading. If 
insiders are concerned about their effect on prices and imitate the liquidity traders' 
preference for the stock relative to the option, realized spreads and volatility in the 
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underlying decrease, which favors uninformed traders. If on the other hand insiders 
maximize profits at every individual trade, results are ambiguous. When there is a 
large proportion of informed traders, liquidity traders benefit in the stock from their 
trades in the option, but when there is a small proportion of informed traders, option 
trading harms liquidity traders' performance in the stock.  
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Figure 1 
The structure of trading 
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Table I 
Updating of beliefs 
 
This table reports updated beliefs, insider’s trading strategy and dealer’s quotes after a trade has been 
executed. There is trade in a stock and a call option on that stock. The stock can either be 110 (with 
probability dH ) or 90. The call option has an exercise price exactly in between the high and low value 
(100). Dealers provide quotes in both markets. They are fully competitive, risk-neutral and profit 
maximizing. Trades are initiated by an informed or uninformed trader with equal probability. Informed 
traders sell when the intrinsic stock value is low, buy when it is high. They maximize their profits at 
every individual trade by selecting the probability p with which they trade in the stock (strategy A). 
Uninformed traders have an equal probability to buy or sell, and to trade in the stock or call.  
 
 
 
 Previous trade dH p Stock bid Stock ask Call bid Call ask 
        
First period  0.50 0.83 93.75 106.25 3.75 6.25 
        
Second period Stock buy 0.81 0.77 99.29 108.93 8.13 8.93 
 Stock sell 0.19 1.00 91.07 100.71 1.07 1.88 
 Call buy 0.63 0.80 95.36 107.50 5.36 7.50 
 Call sell 0.38 0.89 92.50 104.64 2.50 4.64 
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Table II 
Efficiency with insider strategy A 
 
This table reports several efficiency criteria for various levels of option trading. There is trade in a stock 
and a call option on that stock. The stock can either be 110 or 90 with equal probability. The call option 
has an exercise price exactly in between the high and low value (100). Dealers provide quotes in both 
markets. They are fully competitive, risk-neutral and profit maximizing. Trades are initiated by an 
informed trader with probability µ, by an uninformed trader with probability 1- µ. Informed traders sell 
when the intrinsic stock value is low, buy when it is high. They maximize their profits at every initial 
trade (strategy A). Uninformed traders have an equal probability to buy or sell. They trade with 
probability ß in the stock, otherwise in the option. The statistics in panel A apply to the first trade in the 
stock market, those in panel B to the first liquidity trade in the stock market. The statistics below are 
based on one million simulations. Spread measures the average difference between bid and ask; price 
error is the average absolute difference between the transaction price and intrinsic value; volatility is 
the standard deviation of the transaction price. 
 
 
   ß = 0.10 ß = 0.25 ß = 0.50 ß = 0.75 ß = 0.90 ß = 1.00 
 
Panel A: Dynamic criteria based on first stock trade 
 
µ = 0.50 Spread 9.82 12.28 12.26 11.23 10.50 10.00 
 Price error 3.12 4.66 5.98 6.81 7.24 7.50 
 Volatility 4.63 4.99 4.91 4.65 4.47 4.33 
 
µ = 0.25 Spread 10.78 10.58 8.00 6.15 5.41 5.00 
 Price error 5.88 7.12 8.42 9.05 9.26 9.37 
 Volatility 4.92 4.51 3.68 2.93 2.60 2.42 
 
Panel B: Dynamic criteria based on first uninformed stock trade 
 
µ = 0.50 Spread 3.63 5.73 7.20 7.67 7.71 7.67 
 Price error 2.27 3.80 5.22 6.17 6.65 6.94 
 Volatility 4.93 5.81 5.99 5.76 5.55 5.39 
 
µ = 0.25 Spread 6.68 7.67 7.00 5.81 5.21 4.86 
 Price error 5.02 6.55 8.01 8.82 9.12 9.24 
 Volatility 5.89 5.58 4.53 3.52 3.08 2.83 
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Table III 
Efficiency with insider strategy B 
 
This table reports several efficiency criteria for various levels of option trading. There is trade in a stock 
and a call option on that stock. The stock can either be 110 or 90 with equal probability. The call option 
has an exercise price exactly in between the high and low value (100). Dealers provide quotes in both 
markets. They are fully competitive, risk-neutral and profit maximizing. Trades are initiated by an 
informed trader with probability µ, by an uninformed trader with probability 1- µ. Uninformed traders 
have an equal probability to buy or sell. They trade with probability ß in the stock, otherwise in the 
option. Informed traders sell when the intrinsic stock value is low, buy when it is high. They maximize 
profits over several trades by imitating the liquidity traders' preference for the stock relative to the 
option (strategy B). The statistics in panel A apply to the first trade in the stock market, those in panel B 
to the first liquidity trade in the stock market. The statistics below are based on one million simulations. 
Spread measures the average difference between bid and ask; price error is the average absolute 
difference between the transaction price and intrinsic value; volatility is the standard deviation of the 
transaction price. 
 
 
   ß = 0.10 ß = 0.25 ß = 0.50 ß = 0.75 ß = 0.90 ß = 1.00 
 
Panel A: Dynamic criteria based on first stock trade 
 
µ = 0.50 Spread 3.76 6.37 8.36 9.38 9.78 10.00 
 Price error 2.81 4.77 6.27 7.03 7.34 7.50 
 Volatility 4.49 4.99 4.83 4.56 4.42 4.33 
 
µ = 0.25 Spread 3.42 4.30 4.73 4.91 4.97 5.00 
 Price error 6.40 8.06 8.88 9.19 9.31 9.37 
 Volatility 4.79 3.96 3.17 2.72 2.53 2.42 
 
Panel B: Dynamic criteria based on first uninformed stock trade 
 
µ = 0.50 Spread 2.17 4.05 5.85 6.92 7.40 7.67 
 Price error 2.13 3.91 5.49 6.36 6.74 6.95 
 Volatility 4.39 5.33 5.58 5.51 5.44 5.39 
 
µ = 0.25 Spread 3.02 3.97 4.50 4.73 4.82 4.86 
 Price error 5.93 7.70 8.65 9.03 9.17 9.25 
 Volatility 5.05 4.37 3.60 3.15 2.95 2.83 
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Table IV 
Efficiency with insider strategy C 
 
This table reports several efficiency criteria for various levels of option trading. There is trade in a stock 
and a call option on that stock. The stock can either be 110 or 90 with equal probability. The call option 
has an exercise price exactly in between the high and low value (100). Dealers provide quotes in both 
markets. They are fully competitive, risk-neutral and profit maximizing. Trades are initiated by an 
informed trader with probability µ, by an uninformed trader with probability 1- µ. Uninformed traders 
have an equal probability to buy or sell. They trade with probability ß in the stock, otherwise in the 
option. Informed traders sell when the intrinsic stock value is low, buy when it is high. They maximize 
returns at every individual trade, taking into account that a stock investment is four times as large (? = 
4) as an option investment (strategy C). The statistics in panel A apply to the first trade in the stock 
market, those in panel B to the first liquidity trade in the stock market. The statistics below are based on 
one million simulations. Spread measures the average difference between bid and ask; price error is the 
average absolute difference between the transaction price and intrinsic value; volatility is the standard 
deviation of the transaction price. 
 
 
   ß = 0.10 ß = 0.25 ß = 0.50 ß = 0.75 ß = 0.90 ß = 1.00 
 
Panel A: Dynamic criteria based on first stock trade 
 
µ = 0.50 Spread 0.30 0.93 2.54 5.43 8.05 10.00 
 Price error 2.00 3.70 5.33 6.52 7.18 7.49 
 Volatility 4.00 4.82 4.99 4.76 4.49 4.32 
 
µ = 0.25 Spread 0.00 0.00 0.02 1.05 3.17 5.00 
 Price error 5.73 7.37 8.06 8.43 8.98 9.37 
 Volatility 4.94 4.40 3.95 3.64 3.02 2.42 
 
Panel B: Dynamic criteria based on first uninformed stock trade 
 
µ = 0.50 Spread 0.27 0.82 2.13 4.24 6.11 7.67 
 Price error 1.89 3.46 4.86 5.84 6.48 6.95 
 Volatility 3.99 4.88 5.24 5.37 5.41 5.39 
 
µ = 0.25 Spread 0.00 0.00 0.02 1.04 3.05 4.86 
 Price error 5.73 7.37 8.07 8.35 8.82 9.25 
 Volatility 4.94 4.40 3.96 3.75 3.32 2.83 
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Table V 
Insider profits and returns  
 
This table reports profits and investments of insider trading. There is trade in a stock and a call option 
on that stock. The stock can either be 110 or 90 with equal probability. The call option has an exercise 
price exactly in between the high and low value (100). Dealers provide quotes in both markets. They are 
fully competitive, risk-neutral and profit maximizing. Trades are initiated by an informed trader with 
probability µ, by an uninformed trader with probability 1- µ. Uninformed traders have an equal 
probability to buy or sell and to trade the stock or option. Informed traders sell when the intrinsic stock 
value is low, buy when it is high. In strategy A they maximize profits at every individual trade. In 
strategy B they maximize profits over several trades by imitating the liquidity traders' preference for the 
stock relative to the option. In strategy C they maximize returns at every individual trade, taking into 
account that a stock investment is four times as large (? = 4) as an option investment. Trade continues 
till the correct expectation about the intrinsic stock value exceeds 99%. The statistics below are based 
on one million simulations and an intrinsic stock value of 110. Stock, Option and Total profits measure 
the total dollar profits the insider obtains in a trading period in the respective markets; total investments 
are the sum of all insider’s purchase prices; total return (%)  equal total profits divided by total 
investments. 
 
 
        Strategy  
   A B C 
 
µ = 0.50 Stock profits 7.81 6.96 1.94 
 Option profits 0.98 4.48 3.90 
 Total profits 8.79 10.44 5.84 
 Total investments 382.66 319.49 128.31 
 Total return (%) 2.30 3.27 4.55 
 
µ = 0.25 Stock profits 20.81 20.14 0.25 
 Option profits 0.12 10.09 10.39 
 Total profits 20.93 30.23 10.63 
 Total investments 660.14 524.59 76.53 
 Total return (%) 3.17 5.76 13.89 
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